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Draft Recommendation
on a European crisis reaction force - reply to the annual report of the Council
The Assembly,
(, Noting, inthe light of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the need for Europe to acquire military
capabilities in order to respond to similar crises;
(ii) Pointing to the efforts to formulate a policy for gving the European Union "the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces";
(iii) Noting that the present European structure for the autonomous control of operations is based on
national headquarters which are made available on a case-by-case basis,
(*) Noting that the msmber countries have made various headquarters available to WEU, the two
most credible operation headquarters being Northwood (uK) and Creil (France);
(") Taking note also of the possibilrty of NATO CJTF HQs being made available to Europeansl;
(vi) Recalling the considerable number of forces available for use by Europeansl, either as forces
declared "answerable to VIEU" (FAWEI, or as European multinational forces;
(vii) Considering the lessons learnt from peace-support operations, which enable the requirements of
a European crisis reaction force (ECRF) to be more clearly identified;
(viii) Srongly regrening the current European shorbcomings in the fields of decision-making struc-
tues, intelligence gathering and analysis, and planning;
(ix) Considering that Europeans' may have recourse either to an operation headquarters proposed by
a framework nation or to Alliance capabilities, which provides Europeans neither with sufficiqlt visibil-
lty nor the autonomy they desire;
(x) Considering that European headquarters which could serve as a core for a force headquarters
are sufficient in number but that they do not have the capability for joint operations;
(xi) Noting, as regards forces, that many units are designed essentially for territorial defence opera-
tions and that they are therefore ill-adapted to Petersberg missions;
(xii) Regretting the numerous shortcomings of European forces, in particular as regards their strate-
grc mobility, interoperability and capacrty for long periods of deployment outside their national terri-
tory;
(riii) Noting the shortage of European high-tech assets in the fields of tactical intelligence acquisition
(aircraft, UAVs), electronic warfare (amming etc.) and precision-guided munitions;
(xiv) Noting that the European Corps was designed to be part of Europe's collective defence machin-
ery, while its missions encompass humanitarian and peacekeeping operations;
(xr) Observing nonetheless ttrat an effort is being made to adapt the European Corps to Petersberg
missions by means of the concepts of Light Intervention Force (LIF) and Mechanised Intervention Force
(MrF);
(wi) Stressing the engagement of some FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU headquarters in Bos-
nia;
(xvii) Pointing out that the FAWEU headquarters, even though they do not have a joint component,
are nonstheless capable of operating in a joint environment;
i 
'E*"p"r*" mears the 28 WEU countries.
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(rvliy' Noting finally that shortfalls remain with regard to computerised command systsms for Euro-
pean force (FAWEU) headquarters and as regards the composition of predesignated forces, which are
made up almost exclusively of heavy units,
RECOMMENDS THAT T}IE COTJNCIL
L lnvite the 28 members, associate members, associate par0rers and observers to consider establish-
ing a genuine European crisis reaction force (ECRF), permanenfly available at very short notice, as well
as a parallel decision-making body;
2. Establish, for the command of operations, a permanent combined joint headquaters which can
work in close liaison with the WEUiEU Military Statr;
3. Encourage the developmsnt of the intelligence, analysis and planning capabilities of potential
headquarters inthe European autonomous chain of comrnand;
4. Organise ttre joint training of potential forces and headquarters necessary for the comrnand of a
European crisis reaction force for autonomous operations, as well as the joint training of the various
European multinational forces;
5. Improve the procedures for WEU's cooperation with NATO and mernber countries in the field of
intelligence acquisition and analysis, in particular by framing a genuine European policy on satellite
intelligence;
6. Establish agreements withNATO onthe possible use of Alliance assets bythe European crisis
reaction force with a view to resolving crisis situations in Europe;
7 . Draw up a proper inventory of the tlpes of forces able to be deployed for a catalogue of Peters-
berg missions;
8. Develop a proper European military strategic transport capability and the pooling of existing
transport assets, while maintaining the possibility of having recourse to civilian assets;
9. Enhance the deployabilrty of European reaction forces by acquiring a range of deployable equip-
ment such as the shelters required for installing headquarters in the field, or mobile units for the analysis
of air- and space-based imagery;
10. Consider the possible construction of a European command ship to accommodate a deployed
force headquarters for the purpose of a common operation;
I l. Encourage ttre member countries of the European Corps to continue their efforts to adapt it to the
missions of a rapid reaction corps;
12. Have WEU draw up a list of illustrative missions of the Pstersberg type to enable the European
Corps to produce a catalogue speciffing the size and composition of the various types of deployable
forces emanating fromthe European Corps.
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Expl on at ory M emor an dum
(submified by Mr Ziercr, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The appalling events which have been un-
folding in former Yugoslavia for nearly ten years
have brought home to westem nations the need
for military resources to carry out peace-support
operations. In particular, as clearly confirmed by
the declaration issued at the Cologne Summit on
3-4 June 1999, citing the Saint Malo Franco-
British Declaration of 4 December 1998, Europe
"must have the capacity for autonomous action,
backed up by credible military forces, the means
to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in
order to respond to international crises (...)". The
Saint Malo Declaration furttrer stated that 'the
Union must have at its disposal the appropriate
capabilities and instnrments (European capabili-
ties pre-designated within NATO's European pil-
lar or national or multinational European means
outside the NATO framework)".
2. Enacfinent of those declarations would a]-
so contribute to stengthening the European pillar
within the Atlantic Alliance, in line with NATO's
new Strategic Concept as defined at the Wash-
rngton Summit ot23-24 April 1999: "In order to
enhance peace and stabihty in Europe and more
wrdely, the European Allies are strengthening
their capacity for action, including by increasing
their military capabilities. The increase of the
responsibilities and capacities of the European
Allies with respect to security and defsnce en-
hances the security environment of the Alli-
ance"'.
3. This clearly shows the need for a real Eur-
opean crisis reaction force (ECRF) immediateiy
deployable for Petersberg missions in an auto-
nomous European context. However, this in itself
would be of no use without the necessary head-
quarters for fielding such a force, which is why
this report examines the issue of headquarters
before that of forces work-up.
4. tn this connection the recent decision, on
the part of the countries from which the Euro-
pean Corps is drawrU to turn the lauer into a
rapid reaction force is a move in the right direc-
r St rt gi. Concepg (2a Aprit 1999), Part II, para-
graph 18.
tion. Consequently there is a need to prepare
Europe for genuine strategic autonomy, involving
a permanent mrlitary crisis-management capabil-
ity instead ofthe present ad hoc system. [n order
to draw up a real programme for building a de-
fence Europe, it was decided to proceed with an
audit of existing forces, a task currently in hand
in WEU. Additionally it would be he$fuIto de-
fine real convergence criteria, along the lines of
those drawn up for Economic and Monetary Un-
ion.
II. Existing asse/s
5. Since the 1992 Petersberg Declaration,
WEU has put in place the various military com-
ponents 
- 
headquarten, forces and operating pro
cedures 
- 
required to conduct Petersberg oper-
ations.
1. The question ofheadquarters
6. Since WEU does not have a permanent
military structure for conducting operations, it
has to set up an ad hoc charn of command for
each of its operations. It is essential to have a
unified chain of command under the political
control and strategic direction of the Council of
WEU and to have headquarters available at short
notice at each ofthe necessary levels:
Operafion Headquarters (OHQ), a
combined joint structure at strategic
level, located in a WEU member coun-
try and responsible for operational plan-
nmg. It is the comrnand structue dur-
ing an operation and provides an inter-
face between the political authorities 
-
in this instance the Council of WEU 
-
andthe forces onthe ground;
- 
Force Headquarters (FHQ), also a
combined joint strucnue, situated at
operational level, capable of being de-
ployed in or close to the theatre of op-
erations. It is the equivalent of NATO's
CJTF HQ concept. It takes orders from
the operation headquarters;
Component (I-qnd, Air or Naval) Com-
mond Headquarters (CC), which are
multinational and deployed locally. For
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ordinary peacekeeping operations, this
will normally be a land componerf HQ
(the case of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and
KFOR in Kosovo). A land component
headquarters like the European Colps
or the ARRC (ACE Rapid Reaction
Corps) is the ideal size for this func-
tion.
7. In order to successfi.rlly mount an autono-
mous operation under the authority of the WEU
Council, potential headquarters must be pre-
designated and undergo training in lifelike situa-
tions in order to achieve the necessary level of
expertise and to become familiar with WEU pro-
cedures.
(i) FAWEU (forces answerable to IIEU) head-
quarters
8. WEU has asked its msmber countries to
identiff those headquarters which they are pre-
pared to make available to the Organisation:
- 
those countries have designated three
multtnafional force headquarters as
available to WEU (FAWEU), either as
operation headquarters (OHQ) or force
headquarters (FHQ), and three others
as force headquarters (FHQ. However,
it should be pointed out that these
combined headquarters are not joint
HQs (European Corps, ARRC, Euro-
for etc.);
furthermore, numerous national head-
quarters have besn declared as being
available to WEU:
eight joint and three land component
headquarters at OHQ level;
- 
two joint and three land component
headquarters at FHQ level;
in fact it is not yet possible to identiff
those headquarters which are really
suited to the roles of OHQ or FHQ, for
this is the pqpose of the audit cur-
rently being carried out by the WEU
Military Statr (MS). Clearly, if we
apply realistic criteria such as those for
an operation HQ at SFOR or IFOR
level, there are few European head-
quarters which have all the necessary
characteristics:
- 
joirrt HQs able to plan and command
an operation rrvolving 30 O0O-strong
troops;
capable of being made multina-
tional, in other words with sufficient
premises to accommodate foreign
delegations;
with signalling and computerised
command systems at the requisite
level and if necessary also deploy-
able (FHQ);
available at 30 days' notice.
9. For the momsnt, your Rapporteur can see
only two possibilities, namely, the British and
Frsnch joint operation HQs in Northwood and
Creil (near Paris) respectively. Other European
countries are in the process of sening up similar
headquarters.
(ii) CnF NATO Combined Joint Task Forces)
headquarters
10. At NATO's June 1996 Berlin ministerial
meeting, the members of the Alliance agreed on
the possibihty of malong CJTF (Combined Joint
Task Forces) available to Europe for operations
conducted 'trnder the political confrol and stra-
tegic direction of WELI''. The Berlin Commu-
niqu6 explicitly makes provision for the elabora-
tion of European comnund arrangements for
conducting WEU-led operations. This principle
implies designating and training appropriate per-
sonnel, with the European elements within the
HQs performing a dual 
- 
Atlantic and European
- 
function ("double-hatting"). This principle was
recenfly endorsed at the Washington Summit,
although the necessary arrangements bstween the
two organisations for making the asssts available
have not yet been finalised (question of the
"fr amework agreement").
11. For practical purposes, so t}rat combined
joint HQs deployable in the theatre of operations
can be made available to WEU by decision of the
North Atlantic Council, the Alliance has decided
to designate, within so-called "parent headquar-
ters", a core staff which can be strengthened on
request by adding elements supplied by other
NATO bodies or by the member states. This
CJTF HQ concept allows a flexible, multina-
tional approach. Indeed this was the principle
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applied in the case of the IFOR/SFOR force in
Bosnia.
12. The WEU CJTF HQ would have the same
composition as a NATO one and be placed under
the orders of an Operation Comrnander, who in
turn would come under the political auttrority of
the WEU Council. For the purposes of conduct-
ing a WEU-led operatioq replacement of staff on
the basis of nationality could ensure ttrat the
composition of the CJTF HQ reflected the coun-
tries participating in that operation. However, the
NATO member countries have already agreed in
principle that these NATO CJTF HQs - which
are pre-designated 
- 
would be made available
regardless of the national contributions to the
operation in question.
13. With regard to the European chain of
command within NATO, the two organisations
are, according to your Rapporteur's information,
trying to reach agreement on the principle of the
European general appointed to the post of Dep-
uty SACEUR at SHAPE (Mons) assuming spe-
cifically European responsibilities, which would
make lnm a prime candidate for the job of Op-
eration Commander in the case of a WEU-led
operation. If he was not chosen for that role,
D/SACEUR would still be in charge of coordi-
nating the support supplied by NATO to WEU.
14. If D/SACELIR were to be chosen for the
job of Operation Commander, the operation HQ
(OHQ would be the SHAPE headquarters within
which "double-hatted" European officers would
be designated.
15. Furthermore, a number of permanent
NATO headquarters have beur designated as
"parent headquarters". In other words they will
supply the core staff for a CJTF HQ deployable
in the theatre of operations: the headquarters
concerned are CINCENT, CINSOUTH etc.
2. Forces
(i) European multtnattonal forces answerable to
WEU (FAWEU)
16. The forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU),
founded on a well-established concept datmg
back to 1993, offer a whole range of military
resoruces to meet a broad spectrum of operat-
ional requirements. The multinational FAWEU,
of which there are now seven, provide a major
pool of forces which are available for WEU.
These multinational units and their HQs are: the
European Corps, the UKA{etherlands Amphib-
ious Force, the Multinational Division (Centre),
Eurofor (Rapid Deployment Euroforce), Euro-
marfor, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force
and the lst German-Netherlands Co1ps.
17. The European Corps (Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg and Spain), designated a
FAWEU in May 1993, is composed of the lst
Belgian Mechanised Division, the Franco4er-
man Brigade, the lst French Armoured Divisiorq
the 10th German Armoured Division, the 10th
Spanish Mechanised Infarmy Brigade and a Lux-
ernbourg reconnaissance company. At full sfrength
this force is composed of some 80 000 troops.
18. The UKA{etherlands Amphibious Force,
designated a FAWEU in May 1993, is composed
of four infantry battalions (three British and one
Dutch), an Anglo-Dutch artillery brigade and
two boat troops. It is a rapidly deployable fast
landing force with some 6 500 troops.
19. The Multinational Division (Centre), (Bel-
gium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United
IGngdom) was designated a FAWEU in Novem-
ber 1993. This force, composed of a Belgian air-
borne brigade, the 3lst German Airborne Brig-
ade, the llth Dutch Airmobile Brigade, the 24th
British Airmobile Brigade and five battalions of
division-level troops, is some 20 000 strong.
20. Eurofor (Rapid Deployment Euroforce),
with Frsnch, Italiarq Pornrguese and Spanish
elements, became a FAWEU in Novsmber 1995.
It is composed of three units: one I 000 strong at
battalion level, one 3 000 strong at brigade level
and one l0 000 strong at division level, making a
total of some 14 000 troops.
21. Euromarfor (France, Italy, Porlugal and
Spain) also became a FAWEU in Novenrbsr 1995.
This prestructued, non-standing naval force with
both maritime and amphibious capabilities is
composed of operational elements in a constant
state of readiness so that they can regroup at
short notice. A ty?ical configuration might be:
one aircraft carrier, four to six escort units, one
landing force of at least brigade size, amphibious
vessels for the landing force and one combat re-
supply vessel.
22. The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force,
designated a FA\ilEU in November 1997, is an-
other prestructured, non-standing force. In the
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event of its deployment, its amphibious elsmsnts
would retain their own chains of command. The
naval componsnt is composed of units from the
Italian Naval Division and the Spanish Delta
Group. Further naval units are available, depend-
ing on operational requirements. The amphibious
componsnt must be designed and put together
around a stnrch[e to be set up by common
agresment, so that either country could supply
the command structure and base units which
could then be supplemented with headquarters
staff and units from the other country. This
force, which is some 4 000 strong, must be bri-
gade size. Overall comnund would be assumed
by each country in turn on a two-year rotating
basis. The pennanurl multinational element would
be composed of a few officers only.
23. The lst German-Netherlands Corps, which
became a FAWEU in November 1997, is com-
posed of a German armoured division, a Dutch
mechanised division and one support group. Its
headquarters is in Mtrnster and it can supply
planning assistance and 40 000-strong troops for
WEU missions.
(ii) Other European multinational forces
24. Numerous other European multinational
forces have recently been sst up. Even if they
have not officially been declared forces answer-
able to WEU (FAWELI), they are prepared and
trained for operations in a multinational frame-
work such as WEU.
25. The European multinational forces set up
in the NATO framework are:
- 
the Multinational Division (Centre),
(Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom), the UtrV
Nstherlands Amphibious Force and the
lst German-Netherlands Corps, all of
which have been designated FAWEU
and have already been described above;
- 
the Mediterranean mine counter-meas-
ures force MCM FORMED.
26. Other European forces have been set up at
regional level:
Multinational Army Corps North East
(Denmark, Germany, Poland);
European Air Group (France, Ger-
many, Italy, United Kingdom);
Benelux Deployable Air Task Force
Baltic Naval Group;
Hungarian-Romanian Battalion.
27. Finally, a number of those forces are de-
voted specifically to peacekeeping operations:
Nordic Peacekeeping Brigade;
Nordic Logistics Battalion (NORBAT);
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALT-
BAr);
Polish-Ukrainian Battalion;
Multinational United Nations Standby
Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIR-
BRIG)2;
Lithuanian-Polish B attalion;
South East European Brigade (SEE-
BRIGF.
28. The process of creating multinational for-
ces is ongoing and some fifteen multinational
units are in the process of being sst up. Almost
all the counties of Europe are involved: Bul-
gari4 Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Mol-
davia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slo-
venia, Sweden, Ulaaine etc.
(iii) European "national" forces
29. European countries have a large number of
forces, most of which they are prepared to make
available for European multinational operations,
even if not all of thsm have been officially desig-
nated FAWEU. Furthermore, some of them have
experisnce of deploying forces at great distance
for operations abroad. France, for example, has
intervened 22 times in Africa since 1962 and the
United Kingdom also has a lot of experience in
ffimc was set up on 15 December 1996 to con-
dua humanitarian and peace-support operations under
a UN mandate in pursunce of Chapter M of the UN
Charter. The 1l panicipating countries are: Argemtin4
Austr4 Carad4 Denmar\ Finlan4 Iuly, the Nether-
lands, Nor*ay, Polan{ Romania and Sweder It en-
tered inlo its operational phase on I January 1999.
3 On 26 September 1998, 7 states (Albania, Bdgari4
Greece, Italy, Ivlacedoni4 Romania and I\rkey) signed
the founding act of this 5 0O0-strong European milti-
national brigade. It is intsded for peace-support oper-
ations under UN or OSCE auspices, essertially in the
Black Sea region. Slovenia and the United States have
observer stah$ within this force.
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this field, in particular from the Falklands war.
Most European countries have besn involved in
various UN operations (Egypt, Israel, Lebanon,
Cyprus, Cambodia, Africa, Yugoslavia etc.).
30. Even thoughthe navies ofEuropean coun-
tries no longer rule the oceans of the world, most
European counEies are naval powers: the UK
and French navies are the third and fourth in the
world respectively, and the Mediterranean coun-
tries and Scandinavia have a strong naval tra-
dition.
31. All the efforts currently under way in Eur-
ope to reorganise and restruch[e armed forces
are geared towards enhancing the flexibilrty and
mobilrty of those forces so that they caa be
deployed in operations outside the national terri-
tory. The abolition of national military service,
Germany's creation of a crisis reaction force and
the UK's desire to acquire aircraft carriers are
just some illustrations of that trend.
32. By virtue of their presence all over the
world, their experience of deployng expedition-
ary forces over great distances, their naval power
and a land forces organisation increasingly gear-
ed towards multinational operations outside the
national territory, European counfies have an in-
ternational sfrategic dimension. Indeed they are
the only countries, after the United States, if a
modest comparison may be permiued, to be able
to boast of such a dimension.
33. On the basis of the experience acquired
during recsnt peace-support operations under UN
and NATO auspices, engaged forces can be di-
vided into five categories:
battalion, of 500-600 men;
task force, l 000 to I 200 srong, for-
med around a regiment supplemented
with support elements (artillery, signal-
ling, engineering, helicopters etc.). This
is the system most commonly used for
participation in peace-support operations;
brigade,3 000 to 5 000 strong, com-
posed of three to five regiments, with
its own support (artillery, engineering,
helicopters erc.) and capable of autono-
mous action. Even a cautious evalua-
tion (Germany has ttre only crisis re-
action force, half the forces of the
countries concemed have an exclu-
sively territorial organisation) indicates
that there are over 60 brigades for the
ten full members of WEU alone;
division, the level generally used to in-
tegrate national forces in a multination-
al framewo& with a variable com-
position and configuration. Generally a
division is composed of two or three
brigades and some 10 000 to 18 000-
strong trmps, according to NATO stand-
ards. For example:
IFOR (60 000) and SFOR (30 000)
were created from three divisions,
each covering a specific geographic
area. European countries together
can sst up about 15 division-level
structures;
army corps, some 50 000 strong, com-
posed of two or three divisions. This is
the unit to engage in regional conflicts
or peacekeeping operations (IFO&
SFO& KFOR stc.). The ten tull WEU
members together can provide six head-
quarters at army corps level.
34. Thus we see that Europe has at its dis-
posal a theoretically sufficient pool of forces to
react rapidly to crises and provide reinforcemqrts
over a period of time. However, only a few coun-
tries, mainly France and the United Kingdom,
have ttre necessary forces and structures (oint
headquarters at strategic level, air and sea task
forces sbc.) to conduct joint operations during a
regional-level conflict calhng for the involvement
of an army corps.
35. In fact the problem is not so much one of
the capacity of forces, as of their availability.
IlL Shortcomings of European forces -
desir ab le impr ov ements
36. In response to a request from the WEU
ministers at the end of 1998, the German Presi
dency launched an audit ofthe assets and capa-
bilities available for European-led operations. A
first report was presented to the ministers at their
meeting in Bremsn in May 1999.
37. The initial findings may be summarised as
follows:
WEU member countries theoretically
have sufficient assets to conduct Pe-
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tersberg missions. However, in view of
the shortcomings noted with regard to
the decision-making structures, intelli-
gurce and plaruring, it was recom-
mended that any autonomous WEU-led
missions should be confined to simple
operations. For larger-scale operations
it is currently necessary to call on Alli-
ance capabilities;
to make European assets sufficiently
effective, certain capabilities need to be
developed, particularly for ttre prepa-
ration of operations (intelligence, an-
alysis, plaming etc.);
- 
the asssts and capabilities required for
autonomous WEU-led operations need
to be developed. Particular attention
should be paid to joint training and in-
formation exchange among forces and
multinational headquarters answerable
to WEU (FAWEI);
finally, European forces must evolve in
order to adapt to crisis-managemsnt
tasks, particularly with regard to force
readiness, mobility, deployability, in-
teroperability, sustainability and flex-
ibility of composition.
1. Headquarters
38. In parallel, the WEU Military Staffis car-
rying out a study of the actual capacities of the
headquarters proposed by the various WEU
member countries for conducting WEU-led op-
erations. This study, which is under way at the
moment, shows that some offers are unrealistic
and apparently motivated more by political con-
siderations than by a concern for military effec-
tiveness. The Military Staff is therefore endeav-
ouring to draw up a list of those headquarters
which satisff a number of criteria, so as to be
sure that they have a real operational capability.
The main criteria would seem to be: the abilrty to
conduct joint operations, the possibility of adding
a sufficient number of officers to turn a national
HQ into a multinational HQ and the presence of
a sufficiurtly extensive comnund, control and
communications system (numerous links, con-
tacts with the NATO networks, satellite capa-
bilities erc.).
39. ln order to set up its chain of command, in
the absence of permanent structures, WEU uses
the concept of a "framework nation (or group of
nations)". This means that the basic infrastruc-
ture and core staff for the headquarters is sup-
plied by one member country, or possibly, by a
group of countries, on the basis of an existing
multinational headquarters.
(i) Operation headquarters (OHQ)
40. Europe is able to set up the appropriate
command structures for planning, organising, de-
ployrng and conducting operations, using existing
struch.ues such as the French and British joint
central headquarters (PJHQ in Northwood and
COWAMIA in Creil near Paris), which on
many occasions have proven their ability to
mount operations abroad. Moreover, ottrer Euro-
pean countries are in the process of setting up
joint headquarters.
4I. The alternative is to use Alliance assets
and capabilities, which means, for the purposes
of sening up the OHQ, a predesignated Euro-
pean chain of command witldn SHAPE (Sup-
rane Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe), in
Mons. However this is linked with the choice of
Operation Commander in the case of an oper-
ation using Alliance asssts and capabilities.
42. The Assembly has already expressed
doubts about the feasibility of designating Dep-
uty SACEUR (D/SACELJR) Operation Com-
mander for a European-led (WEU or EU) opera-
tion, since ttris general has many problems to
deal wilh other than preparing himself for such a
function. Moreover, he himself pointed out that
during an emerging crisis, he would have ottrer
tasks within SFIAPE which he could probably
not abandon. If the comrnander of the WEU/EU-
led operation camot be D/SACEUR, another
European general must be appointed within
SHAPE with the sole task of preparing for that
role. That officer would therefore be responsible
for organising and running the European military
pillar within the Alliance, in particular by sening
up the European chain of comnumd. All this
would appear to be in line with the 1996 Berlin
decisions, recently reaffirmed at NATO's Wash-
lngton Summit, and is essential for establishing a
genuinely European chain of command.
43. However, any decision to use a European
chain of command within SHAPE must be ap-
proved by SACEUR himself. He will always
have very valid reasons, during a crisis in or
l0
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around Europe, not to part with his military statr,
which may be needed to plan possible NATO
intervsntion. Clearly then, in order to set up a
European operation headquarters, a solution
contingent on the availability of NATO capabili-
ties is not reliable and does not give Europe suf-
ficient autonomy. Europe must therefore be able
to avail itself of the "framework nation" concept
to set up a headquarters swiftly.
44. However, this "framework nation' solu-
tion, based on national cores which can be turned
into multinational HQs, has two drawbacks.
Firstly, it takes some time to activate a core HQ
which is not permanently multinational and to
integrate the reinforcing elements, which are not
necessarily pretrained to work with that core.
Secondly, there may be political problans in
connection with the choice of "framework na-
tion", which may also delay the decision-making
process.
45. To offset these drawbacks, a permanent
multinational headquarters, or at least the core of
such a headquarters, must be set up. Its task
would be to commence military planning at the
earliest possible stage during an emerging crisis,
which would mean its being in close contact with
the WEU/EU Military Statrin charge of prepar-
ing the strategic options. It must therefore be
located in the same place as the MS and if pos-
sible, backed up by the same administrative
services.
46. For an operation headquarters to be effi-
cient it must have facilities for gathering and
merging intelligence and data and for situation
analysis. In this field the recent WEU audit of
European forces has revealed serious gaps. There
is no overall policy for European intelligence
gathering and management, especially for classi-
fied intelligence. Before there can be any form of
discussion of the shortage of intelligence-gather-
ing means, the necessary agreements must be
developed for WEU member countries to pool
intelligence.
47. ln this area the WEU Satellite Centre cap-
ability is still limited by the fact that it depends
on purchases of commercial imagery or the sup-
ply of Helios images over which a small group of
countries have power ofdecision. Procedures for
cooperation between the Cenae and ottrer inter-
national organisations, such as the European
Union and NATO, again need to be developed.
48. As regards the crisis-managsment planning
capability of those European Operation Head-
quarters (OHQs) liable under the present cir-
cumstances to be selecte4 the WEU audit draws
attention to the difficulties that might arise from
turning the existing HQs into multinational HQs,
in the absence of systernatic trarmng of such HQs
in the framework of WEU's exercise policy to
familiarisethem with European forces (FAWEU)
work-up procedures.
(ii) Force headquarters @HQ)
49. The concept of a combined joint European
force headquarters that can be deployed in the
theatre of operations is very close to NATO's
Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF
HQ) concept. With its 1996 Berlin decision, the
Alliance agreed to the possibility of making
CJTF HQs available to WEU. The main "parent
HQs" around which these headquarters, deploy-
able in the theatre of operations, are to be built,
have been chosen within NATO (AFCENT,
AFSOLffiT. Now the concept needs to be vali.
dated and the headquarters staff must be trained
in lifelike conditions of deployment. Many new
problems arise in connection with the need to
project these NATO HQ elements which up unul
now were fixed. Finally, the issue of the nation-
alrty of the officers within such a headquarters
remains to be clarified. NATO has decided ttrat 
-
in principle 
- 
the NATO CJTF HQ would be
made available to WEU without replacing its
officers on the basis of nationalrty It is doubtfrrl
whether a strict application of this rule would be
possible in the theatre of operations, if some na-
tions did not wish to participate.
50. The problem is more straightforward in
the case of European headquarters which can be
used to provide a core for a force headquarters,
since there are more HQs available at this level
tlran at that of Operation Commander, and a
number of permanent European multinational
headquarters already exist. However, the head-
quarters being proposed by member countries as
possible force headquarters are not joint struc-
tures.
51. ln fact, we have lea:ned from experience
in recent years that it is possible for peacekeep-
ing missions of the Paersberg type to deploy a
land component headquarters on the ground, and
to add to it the necessary air and naval compo-
nents to manage the air and naval support activi-
11
DOCUMENT 1668
ties for that type of force (IFOR/SFO& KFOR
etc.). The operational comnxmd of the forces
assigned to such support activities (airlift, sealift,
etc.) can be exercised at operation HQ level.
52. It is true that the joint nature of the force
HQ remains a problem for joint operations of
combat forces. What is needed, therefore, are op-
erational European air and naval componsnts
which can be used to reinforce existing European
multinational headquarters such as Euromarfor
or the European Air Group.
53. The case of a European sea-based head-
quarters for the command of a landing operation
followed by a land-based operation (evacuation
mission, ensuring security in a troublespot,
peacekeeping etc.) poses a particular problem,
since ideally, to accommodate a joint headquar-
ters with a staff of 200, a real command ship
such as the United States' "Mount Whitrey"
would be required. However, the UK and France
possess some capabihty in the field of specialised
transport vessels, such as "Ocean" (LJK) and
"Foudre" (France). Europe's EOLE 98 exercise
demonstrated that it is feasible to place a head-
quarters with about 100 staff on board ship and
to perform command operations under satisfac-
tory command and control arrangements. How-
ever, the ideal solution would be to build a Euro-
pean command ship on a collaborative basis.
2. Forces
54. The purpose of the audit being conducted
by the WEU Military Staff is to gst a precise
idea ofthe capacity ofEuropean forces to carry
out ttre frrll range of Petersberg missions. How-
ever, it is encountering some difficulties wittr
obtaining all the relevant information from coun-
ties about the national and multinational forces
designated as FAWEU. Generally speaking, we
can imagine that some of them 
- 
such as the
European Corps and the Multinational Division
(Centre) 
- 
are equipped and organised as combat
units for the purpose of collective defence, and
that they are therefore not well adapted to Pe-
tersberg missions which call for light, deployable
equipment.
55. The creation of a multinational force for a
WEU-led crisis-management operation calls for
the designation of both national and multinational
units during the course of a "forces generation
conference". The current system is for the vari-
ous countries to propose units with reference to
their size and capabilities, and ttre force compo-
sition is determined by a process of 'hegotiation"
among the participating states, which all have
specific, politically-motivated dsmands, in par-
ticular with regard to tanspa^rurcy. Like the
process of designating the force and operation
headquarters, this has the effect of delaying de-
cision-making during a crisis. Hence, the avail-
abilrty of a large multinational unit in which each
participating state's "share" has been decided in
advance can save lot oftime.
56. ln 1998, NATO performed an evaluation
of WEU assets and capabilities for Petersberg
missions on ttre basis of six illusrative mission
profiles submitted by WEU. The main criteria
for analysing forces were: strategic mobility,
force readiness, deployabilrty, interoperability
and sustainability.
57. It was concluded from that evaluation that
the forces of the WEU countries are more ttran
adequate to meet those requiremsnts. However,
there are a number of resfrictions, given ttrat the
illustative missions considered did not call for
high-intensrty combat operations and that mis-
sions in certain specific areas could require
equipmant which is not available in sufficiently
large quantities in WEU countries.
(i) Qualinnve shortcomings of theforces
58. Peace-support operations in recent years,
in whatever framework the forces were engaged,
have revealed a number of shortcomings:
strategic mobility: Europe's heavy air-
lift capability is not sufficient for an
emergency operation. In terms of as-
sets, there has been some progress as a
result of bilateral agreements or agree-
ments with WEU. The Franco-Belgrar,,
Franco-British and Franco4erman
agreements on air projection, the agree-
ment reached on 30 June 1997 between
Ukraine and WEU on the provision of
long-haul strateglc lift capabrlrty and the
exchanges of information between
Russia and WEU on the use of Ilyushin
aircraft for in-flight fuelling do not
provide Europe wfth real strategic
mobility capability but at least make it
possible to manage existing capabilities
better. Naval military assets must be
12
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supplflnented by civilian transport
(United Kingdom and France during
the Gulf War), and even then not all
civilian assets are suitable for the trans-
port of heavy equipment. WEU must
keep a close eye on this issue of Eur-
ope's sealift capability;
state of readiness'. up until now this
was defined by NATO msmbers in
terms of the forces' readiness for col-
lective defence. A number of units am-
ong the allied reaction forces have a
high degree ofreadiness, but are plac-
ed under NATO command in peace-
time. WEU needs to be better informed
with regard to the readiness of the
forces of its member countries;
deployability: for some time now, this
aspect has besn a criterion for the re-
structuring of the member countries'
forces and it is a major objective for
all the European multinational forces
that have been set up recently;
interoperabrlrDl: this question is being
tackled by NATO. As a result of the
experience gathered during peacekeep-
ing operations in former Yugoslavia,
the interoperability of the communi-
cation and command systems of the
Alliance member states actively in-
volved in operations has considerably
improved in practice. However, at the
level of Europe as a whole 
- 
WEU fulI
members, associate members and asso-
ciate paru:ers 
- 
the situation varies
considerably;
sustainabilifl: since rotation of staff is
essential 
- 
in general the period of
service for such operations is from four
to six months 
- 
provision must be made
for a resewe force which is three times
as large as the initial force, which is not
always the case when member coun-
tries propose forces at the beginning of
a crisis. Moreover, logistic support for
forces deployed far from their home
base is a major undertaking which gen-
erally remains the responsibility of the
contributing country. Some countries
have a lot of progress to make in this
area. This issue calls for stronger co-
operation among European countries.
Indeed the Scandinavian countries
have set the example with their 'Nordic
Common Logistic Battalion".
(ii) Capabilittes required by forces
59. An analysis of recent peace-support op-
erations reveals flrat European forces fall short as
regards a number of capabilities that are essential
for genuine autonomy in the field of Petersberg
missions. This can be explained by the fact that
these capabilities include all the asssts needed for
generating forces for collective defence pu{poses,
hitherto always organised in a NATO frame-
work, or, more rarely, in a national framework
for some countries conducting missions abroad.
These shortcomings are particularly acute in the
field of headquarters, deployable comrnand sys-
tems, intelligsnce, reconnaissance and targst-ac-
quisition systems.
60. In the intelligence field" the efforts under
way to frame a genuine European space-based
intelligence policy and to develop tle use of the
Torrej6n Satellite Centre must be pursued. lntel-
ligence is exkanely important for peace-support
operations and the headquarters ofthe deployable
forces must be equipped with truly multinational
intelligence-processing units. As far as command
capabilities are concerned, efforts must focus on
CIS (communications and information systans)
interoperabillty in accordance with NATO stan-
dards, and on developing deployability through
the acquisition of the shelters needed for install-
ing headquarters and their command systems on
the ground. The European EOLE exercise re-
ferred to earlier provided an opportunity for the
real-scale training of such a deployable head-
quarters. Finally, the Kosovo operation high-
lighted the usefulness of UAVs (unmanned aerial
vehicles) for reconnaissance and target-acquisi-
tion purposes. Major efforts are required, if pos-
sible in cooperation, in order to equip European
forces with systems ofthis kind.
61. NATO's air campaign in Kosovo also re-
vealed Europe's wealorcss in the field of high-
tech equipment. US Defense Secretary Cohsn
recently explaineda:
t Add** before the trSS, San Diegq 9 September
1999.
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"The United States conducted virtually
two-thirds of all the support sorlies that
were flown and half of the combat mis-
sions. And because we were the only coun-
try with precision-guided munitions that
can operate in all weather, heavy cloud
cover in the initial stage of this campaign
made it almost an exclusively American
operation".
62. At the present time, the shortage of "all-
weather" assault aircraft equipped with "preci-
sion-guided munitions" puts European countries
at a considerable disadvantage. However, the re-
cent decisions to equip the British-Italian Torn-
ado and the Frsnch Mirage and Rafale aircraft
with Apache-Storm Shadow missiles should off-
set that major drawback in a few years' time.
However, in view of the high consumption rate of
modern weaponry, and of laser-guided bombs in
particular, during the 78{ay campaign of air
strikes, it is necessary to snsure that the funding
earmarked for the munitions will be sufficisnt.
(iii) Strengthening European cooperation
63. In addition to the abovemsntioned efforts
to equip European forces, a number of collabo-
rative projects should improve Europe's capacity
for setting up groups of forces in times of crisis.
First of all, joint training of the various existing
European multinational forces is essential to en-
hance their interoperabihry. The exercises policy
currently directed by the WEU Military Staff
must be systematically pursued in full awareness
of the particular financial effort that it requires
from the participant nations. Moreover, this pol-
icy will enable the WEU Military Staffto assess
the real capacity of those nations for generating
forces during a crisis. Finally, it will help the
various participating states to realise that Euro-
pean assets, when pooled, constitute a genuine
capability for conducting Petersberg missions.
64. Furthermore, these forces must be used as
soon as possible for real operations, for this is
crucial for motivating personnel and giving them
the sense of belonging to a single European
stucture, a prerequisite for its operational effi-
ciency.
65. ln addition, a set of"convergence criteria"
needs to be drawn up in order to help European
countries determine which forces they are pre-
pared to make available to WEU (FAWEU). Mr
Solana recently stated5 in this connection that:
"These convergence criteria should focus
less on the money governments put into
defence budgets and more on what they get
out in terms of flexible forces".
66. Although most European countries these
days are not prepared to give up whole sections
of their military production in favour of a divi-
sion of labour among European countries, there
is still scope for more efficient use of defence
budgets by systunatically seeking economies of
scale in the fields of support and training and by
doing away with unnecessary duplication through
combined European, as opposed to national, so-
lutions.
67. The agreement betwesn the Belgian and
Dutch navies to sst up a joint military staff and
support service is a positive step on the way to
eliminating costly duplication.
68. The most promising approach is the pool-
1ng of logistic support services for equipment
developed in the framework of collaborative Eur-
opean programmes, such as Eurofighter and per-
haps also Airbus A 400-M. [n the naval area one
could imagine creating a pool of support vessels,
for instance tanrkers, and the constn:ction of a
collaborative European command ship, as al-
ready suggested earlier.
69. Furthermore, there could be systematic
pooling of elements of military forces among sev-
eral willing nations. The best example currently
is probably the Franco-German agreemsnt on
military airlift, which involves pooling Transall
aircraft. Similar agreements could be reached for
transport helicopters, in particular the future
NH9O.
70. Finally, in the field of training on certain
items of equipment common to several countries,
there is a need for joint schools and training
centres such as the Franco-German school for
Tiger helicopter pilots.
(iv) The case of the European Corps
71. The underlying idea of the European
Corps is to provide Europe with its own military
capability. This idea was already affirmed in ttre
La Rochelle report of 22May 1992, which stated
t 
,r,.-t"*ie* wiLhlhe Financial Times, Septerriber 1999
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that "ttre sefting-up of the European Corps re-
flects the resolve of the participating countries to
shoulder, jointly and by corrmon agreement in
the context of a European Union which will ev-
entually have a common defence policy, their res-
ponsibilities in the field of security and peace-
keeping"6.
72. In their joint declaration published at the
Cologne Summit on 3-4 June 1999, the five
states participatrng in the European Corps an-
nounced their decision to fiansform it into a
"European rapid reaction force" capable of
large-scale deployment outside of the Union's
borders.
(a) Tasl<s
73. The La Rochelle report of 22 May 1992
gives that force three major tasks:
common defence of the allies in the
WEU/NATO framework;
peacekeeping and peacemaking;
humanitarian operations.
The European Corps, originally conceived as a
component of Europe's collective defence, is or-
ganised as an army corps equipped with heavy
armamsnts. Its conversion into a rapid reaction
force entails changing the current organisation of
its headquarters and setung up units more adap-
ted to the new tasks while maintaining its initial
capability.
(b) Current confi guration
74. In addition to its initial con-figuration as an
army corps adapted to territorial defence, the
European Corps, in order to adjust to irc various
humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks, can form,
from its component units:
either a light intervention force ftIF)
of brigade size (3 000 to 5 000 suong),
essentially for low-intensity humanitar-
ian operations. Such a force can be-
come operational within a few weeks
and must be capable of assuring its
own protection and accomplishing its
mission even if the situation deterio-
rates. The link betwesn the Operation
-u 
ra nocneu" repor! 22 }y'ray lggz, on the missions of
the European Corps.
HQ and the deployed force is provided
by a brigade headquarters, preferably
that of the Franco-German Brigade.
Other units may be added to that force
as required by the circumstances;
or a mechanised intervention force
MF) of division size (15 000 to
20 000 strong), for peacekeeping or
peacemaking operations. The Com-
mander of the European Colps would
be personally in charge of deploying
such an MIF and in that case, the
Corps headquarters would play the part
of parent HQ for the land component
comnumd (LCC)?. An MIF can be set
up within 20 to 60 days and is based on
a core composed of five brigades. It is
necessary, when using such a force for
mobile operations, to have a headquar-
ters at division level.
75. The European Corps has received regular
training since 1994, by means of a major annual
main defence exercise (of the Pegasus Upe) un-
der NATO auspices and various other exercises
for missions of the Petersberg lype in the WEU
or NATO framework8.
(c) The engagement in Bosnia
76. Since June 1998, the European Corps
headquarters has participated in SFOR by sec-
onding staff to the SFOR HQ in Bomia. The
constitusnt nations of the European Colps had
the following obj ectives :
- 
to participate in a credible and visible
fashion;
- 
to maintain their participation until the
end of the mission or for a maximum
duration of t'wo years;
- 
to be involved in the planning process
in the same capacrty as any other
NATO headquarters;
- 
to make the maximum contribution to
the SFOR HQ that is acceptable to
NATO;
-tcc' 
t^d component comrnnd
8 SeeAppendix
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- 
to focus the activities of its personnel
essentially on management of opera-
tions and CIMICe activities.
A total of 747 staff from the European Corps
HQ, including 33 officers, have been seconded to
SFOR in Sarajevo. They represent 37Yo of the
total staffofthe NATO HQ in Bosnia.
(d) Desirable developments
77. Discussions are curre,nfly under way am-
ong the componsnt states of the European Corps
concerning its transformation into a European
rapid reaction force, in accordance with ttre Col-
ogne decisions. The European Corps must have
the capacity to fulfil the following functions:
land componurt command (LCC) in the
role ofheadquarters for an operational
or peace-support force of the SFOR or
KFOR type;
rapid reaction corps dunng crises, in-
volving all or some of the predesig-
nated forces as well as other units, on
request including those of non-member
nations. It would make sense to use the
present MIF or LIF organisational set-
up as a basis, adapting it as necessary
to rapid reaction missions. There is a
need furthernore to draw up a cata-
logue of deployable forces stemming
from the European Corps by size and
composition;
army corps for collective territorial de-
fence, using all pre{esignated forces.
(e) Headquarters
78. The Corps headquarters will need to be
adapted to give it the structwe of an LCC head-
quarters for out-of-area operations and for civil-
military operations.
79. The present headquarters is not a joint
headquarters in any real sense, but it could be
capable of operating in a joint environment,
thanks to its "air" element. The role of that ele-
ment could range, theoretically, from that of an
AOCCI0 to that of a proper air component com-
mandll, but the pressnt air element can only per-
form the tasks of an AOCC.
80. The stnrchrre that is set up must snable the
force to be activated according to the most de-
manding scenario (LCC), using ttre principle of a
core elemsnt. Furthermore, due account must be
taken of the deficiencies revealed by the NATO
Cooperative Guard 1999 exercise in the fields of
civil-military activities, engineering, planning
capabilities etc.
81. The headquarters battalion must have a
structure that is sufficie,nt to support an LCC
headquarters. The currsnt battalion is not the
right size for certain functions that must be per-
formed dunng operations abroad (energy supply,
food supplies in the field etc.). Life-support and
protection functions need therefore to be
strengthened.
82. The present (German and Franch) com-
munications and information systems (CIS) are
not compatible, hence a means must be found to
achieve interoperabilrty, so that they can be used
by the Corps HQ under all circumstances. A
good initiative would be to set up a multinational
signalling brigade. It is a priority, with a view to
achieving real mobility, for the European Corps
to procure shelters equipped with CIS. This
would allow the headquarters to be installed
swiftly in any theatre of operations.
83. Finally, an essential point to which very
carefirl attention must be pai( is the fact that the
European Corps does not have an autonomous
intelligence capability. However, it will soon be
Iinked up to NATO's BICES and CRONOS net-
works.
(fl Forces
84. The principle of predesignated forces or
declared capabilities must be maintained. It is
important that states should make available to the
European Colps divisions composed not only of
heavy, but also lightweight units, in order to in-
toduce the element of flexibility that is necessary
for a rapid reaction corps.
85. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
nrle of unanimity applies to any decision taken
trcnrnc civil-military cooperation.
'0 AOCC: air operation coordination cenlre.
fr Oir."tiur No. 5 to the Corps Commanding general,
1995.
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by the Joint Commiueer2, which means that non-
participation by one member state will have con-
sequences for ttre very organisation ofthe rapid
reaction corps. A possible solution would be to
make certain key elemants redundant, so that
several functional modules of the saJne type
would be available.
86. Moreover, in case of need, member states
can generally provide the European Corps with
non-allocated forces for certain exercises or op-
erations. One possibility envisaged, for example,
was that of making Belgian paratrooper units
available.
(g)Conclusions
87. The European Corps is an excellent ex-
ample of flexible and modular European coop-
eration, for although its basic stmcture is limited
to forces from its five member states, units from
other states can nonetleless be added for certain
specific operations. These days the prevailing ap-
proach is one of pragmatisnq and indeed flex-
ibility based on multinational military cooper-
ation is the general rule for the forces answerable
toWEU.
88. One may regret the lack of a legal and in-
stitutional status for the European Corps head-
quarters and the Corps itself3. Indeed, for the
moment it cannot procure equipment in its own
right, which means going through the national
budgetary channels, with the considerable delays
that this sntails. The future rationalisation of ar-
mamsnts progranrmes at European level will
doubtless make it possible to move from interop-
erable to identical equipment.
89. In short, it is essential to reorganise the
European Corps headquarters with a view to
equipprng it with deployable command struc-
tures, suited to its role ofheadquarters for crisis
reaction forces engaged outside EU territory in
an environment of peace-support operations.
Furthermore, its composition 
- 
in terms of forces
-" 
E .h **ty has two reprcsentatives on this Com-
mittee. They are the political directors of the foreigr
afain minisries and the chiefs of defence staffs. The
Committee informs the political authorities of the
different countries of the possibilities for deploying the
European Corps.
" See the report on "European armed forces", essernUty
Document 1,168, submitted blr Mr de Decker on behalf
of rhe Defence Committ€e, 12 June 1995.
capable of projection 
- 
must be very flexible so
that it can adaptto specific crisis situations case-
by-case.
IV A genuine European crisis reactionforce
90. [n fact, the only way to drastically shorten
response time, given the time it takes to organise
forces on an ad hoc basis, is to sst up a Euro-
pean standing force answerable to WEU, which
could be called the European Crisis Reaction
Force (ECRF). This is not a new idea. Indeed"
the Assembly report of 1 Decenrber 1997 on
'The WEU Military Committee"ra recommended
ttrat ttre Council should "establish an immediate
WEU reaction force consisting of a multinational
light infantry division supported by an air and
naval component, available at very short notice
(.. .);".
91. Indeed, the abovemsntioned report showed
that Operation Alba owed its success to the rapid
reaction of a force that was limited in size, but
which was deployed before the crisis got out of
hand.
92. For such a force to be effective, it would
need to be composed of units made available by
individual states for a substantial period of time
and placed from the outsst under the authority of
a European Chief-of-Stafi who would execute
orders from the WEU Council in the event of a
crisis. Thus this force would have a permanent
multinahonal headquarters, which would solve
the problem of the absence of a permanent Euro-
pean force headquarters at Force Comrnander
level in the theatre of operations. This multina-
tional headquarters would be supported by a
European General Staffwhich would develop out
of the present WEU Military Stafl and which
would exercise at European level the same organ-
isational and operational functions as a general
staffat national level.
93. With such a European reaction force,
WEU member countries would have at their dis-
posal a pool of forces which they could call on
immediately. The level of participation of the
different countries would have to be calculated
on the basis of objeclive and generally accepted
criteria (such as "convergence criteria"), in such
i?R.p"rt 
zubmitted onbehalf ofthe Defence Committee
by Mr Gannattasio, Rapporteu4, assernUy Documemt
r591.
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a way as to have a force of army corps size,
some 50 000 strong, with a pre-designated sup-
port and transport capability at its disposal. Its
fundmg would be shared equitably among the
member countries.
94. This type of pre-organised force has often
been criticised on the grounds that if one country
decides not to participate, this may upset its
whole organisation at the last minute. This is
why such a force must be designed for redun-
dancy of the key elements in order to provide
functional modules (comprising infantry, signal-
ling, headquarters support mechanised units, at-
tack or support helicopters etc.) of different
nationalities so that it cannot be disrupted by the
failure of some msmber countries to participate.
95. To enable this crisis reaction force to be
set up swiftly, it would be very useflrl to draw up
a catalogue of illustrative missions of the Peters-
berg type and, on the basis of the audit of assets
currently under way in WEU, to produce an in-
ventory of the forces required for those missions.
Thus the ECRF would be organised in the form
of a pool of forces available at the shortest pos-
sible notice, according to the specific mission
requirements, under the responsibility of the
ECRF Commander.
96. Since the main element of the ECRF
would be its headquarters, the latter must be de-
ployable in the theatre of operations as a force
headquarters and would require, as a priority, the
followrng asssts:
capability for gathering and process-
ing intelligence in the field: efforts
must focus on facilities for collecting
human intelligence and processing aer-
ial (UAVs) and satellite images. It is
very important in this respect that the
ECRF should be equipped with a sat-
ellite image receiver station deployable
in the theate of operations for the real-
time processing of such imagery. Such
equipment exists, for example the
Helios mobile station which was dem-
onstrated during the Crisex 98 exercise;
means of civil-military action: given
the environment in which Petersberg
missions take place, due account must
be taken of relations with the local ci
vilian population and of the need for
coordination with the civilian organisa-
tions present in the field. The ECRF
should therefore be equipped to deal
with humanitarian aid and the protec-
tion of the civilian population (helicop-
ter tansport, emergsncy medical equip-
ment, ground-based logistics for deliv-
ering food and medecines or protecting
convoys etc.). Furthernore, the ECRF,
in coordination with governmental
bodies and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), should be capable of ac-
tion for the reconsfruction or repair of
damagd infrastructure such as bridges.
For that purpose it requires engineering
components, which could be in the
form of reserve forces specialised in
engrneering.
V Conclusions and prospects
97. The creation of a European military in-
stnrment for crisis managemsnt would not only
free Europe from its unilateral dependance on the
United States, improve the possibilities for con-
trolling and managing crises and thereby streng-
then NATO as a whole, but would also open up
possibilities and prospects for a European de-
fence force. The old idea of a European army
would be given new and lasting impetus by the
creation of a European crisis reaction force. Al-
though we havs not even started creating the
conditions for such an army, it would nonetheless
be usefirl, by way of conclusiorq to briefly review
the advantages of such a European defence com-
ponent:
maximum interoperability;
standardisation of weapons systsms,
training and principles of engagement;
single comrnand;
- 
possibility of a broad-based division of
the military tasks;
considerable savings and synergy ef-
fects.
98. However, for the moment we see no signs
of the political will to give closer consideration to
the idea of a European army. On the conaary,
the fear is not totally unjustified that the creation
of a crisis reaction force might for some consid-
erable time to come temper the desire for military
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commonality, and that any further-reaching plans
for a European military infrastnrcrure would be
shelved. We therefore need to use our powers of
persuasion to bring about more comprehensive
military cooperation among par0rer countries.
The time does not appear ripe, following the re-
nunciation of national economic and monetary
sovereignty in accordance with the Maastricht
Treaty, for further sovereign rights to be sacri-
ficed on the altar of European unity. However, it
is urgent to act, for the longer we put off Euro-
pean military integration, the more costly this
process 
- 
which at the snd of the day is inevit-
able 
- 
will become.
99. On the other hand, the creation of a Euro-
pean crisis reaction force is a first important step
towards that integration, since such a formation
can be upected to develop its own dynamic and
lead to technical constraints which can only be
mastered jointly. However, a prerequisite for that
is a readiness on the part of the parbrcr countries
to make available the considerable sums required
to build up such a force and make available the
relevant military capabilities. Such readiness
does not appear to exist for the moment. On the
contrary, European military capabilities sesm to
be in decline. National defsnce budgets are being
misused to balance budgets and offset deficits
elsewhere. Many national governments do not
seem at the moment to attach much value to se-
curity. Only a few existing units are suitable for
creating such a crisis reaction force and it is
therefore essential to re-equip and restructure
existing national armed forces and enhance their
combat effective,ness. Immediate steps should be
takento deal withthis task.
100. Parliamentary scrutiny of an independsnt
European military component is essential and
will, to begin witlu and until such time as ttre
European Parliament's powers are extended ac-
cordingly, depend on ilre votes of the national
parliaments and of the WEU Assembly.
l0l. Finally, a European crisis reaction capa-
bility is necessary and possible. It would be a
further milestone on the road towards European
unity and give new impetus to the idea of a
global European defence. Its achievement will be
a test of the resolve of WEU states to strengthen
their defence capabilities and fully to restore their
standing as alliance partrcrs at the highest level.
l9
APPENDICES DOCUMENT 1668
APPENDIX I
Declorationt issued by the member states of the Europeon Corps
on the occasion of the Cologne European Council Summit on 3 June 1999
On the occasion of the Cologne European Council, which showed the determination of the Euro-
pean Union to acquire the autonomous assets needed to take decisions and action in response to
crises, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxernbourg and Spain agreed to adapt the European Corps,
in particular its headquarters, to the new strategic environment in order to transfonn it into a
European rapid reaction corps available for EU- and NATO-led operations.
This army corps, thus adapted, will mest the desire of the European Union for its members to
have at their disposal forces suitable for crisis-managsment operations.
This decision, which should be executed within a year, constitutes a practical contribution to
creating the assets that will one day enable the European Union to play in full its role on the in-
ternational stage.
runofficial translation
20
APPENDICES DOCUMENT 1668
APPENDIX II
Exercises of the European Corps
The aim of the exercises conducted by the European Corps, apart from the Pegasus series of exercises,
concemed with the common defence of the allies, is to develop the Corps' operational assets in the fietd
of peacekeeping or peacemaking operations (Cobra exercise, June 1997) or that of humanitarian activi-
ties @elican exercise, June 1999).
Exercises conduaed in the
framework of Article 5 ofthe
Washington Treaty under
NATO auspices
Peacekeeping and
peacebuilding
operations,
Petersberg missions
Exercises conducted in the
framework of a humanitarian
operation under WEU auspices
Pegasus 1994
Pegasus 1995
Pegasus 1996
Pegasus 1998
Pegasus 2000
Cooperative Guard 1999
Cobra 1997 Eurotransitex 1995
Crisex 1996
Pelican 1999
Exercises of the Pegasus Ope correspond to main allied defence operations. The aim in each
case is to test the interoperability of the headquarters and troops of the European Corps over
large areas, in joint combat operations characterised by rapid changes of attitude. Although
the scenarios for ttre Pegasus exercises have always been NATO-based, the 1996 exercise
was the first in which a NATO HQ actually participated. This was LANDCENT2, which
played an active role as the upper echelon of the Corps.
During the Cooperative Guard exercise (May 1999), the European Corps played the part of
LCC3 parent headquarters, which meant that ttre European Corps Comrnander played the part
of Commander of all the land forces.
Cobra 1997 provided an oppornrnity to test the deployment concept for an MIF of the size of
a strengthened division.
The aim of Eurotransitex 1995, conducted under WEU auspices, was to test the procedures
for the long-distance strategic deployment of the Colps and for an evacuation operation in a
crisis zone. The joint nature of this exercise, which involved land, air and naval transport, was
particularly stnking.
Cnsex 1996 tested the procedures for restoring conditions ur which humanitarian aid can be
transported to a fictitious country. This exercise, with a strong joint element, involved the de-
ployment of forces at a distance of 5 000 km from Strasbourg. Its multinational character was
extended to include atl full mernber states of WEU.
Pelican 1999 provided the opportunity to test the LIF concept. Its aim was to check the
Corps' capacity for projecting forces into a conflict zone in order to carry out humanitarian
operations.
tfnNOCff.ff: Alied l,and Forces Central Europe.
'LCC: Land Component ftmmand-
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